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Abstract: For the purpose of this paper we conducted an empirical survey of academic 
staff at two German law schools (Heinrich-Heine University Düsseldorf; Bucerius Law 
School), two UK ones (University of East Anglia; University of Edinburgh) and one 
Irish one (Trinity College, Dublin). We asked the legal scholars to indicate to what ex-
tent they identify with legal research as part of humanities, as part of social sciences, 
and as akin to the analysis of law in legal practice. In this paper we present and discuss 
our results, using tools of both classical and compositional statistics. We also relate our 
data to contextual information about these legal scholars (e.g., training, career stage) as 
well as institutional and country differences. Our main general finding is that scholars of 
the German law schools have a relatively strong preference for practical legal research 
and scholars of the UK and Irish law schools a relatively strong preference for law as 
humanities. Some of our specific findings are that international legal scholars tend to be 
closer to the social sciences and that younger scholars and private lawyers tend to be 
closer to practical legal research. We also observe some signs of convergence since, 
across the five law schools, scholars told us that they tend to use practical legal research 
methods less often, and social sciences methods more often, than ten years ago. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Assume the following scenario: a law professor visits her university cafeteria and wants 
to sit at a table where she can get some useful comments on the method she plans to use 
in one of her papers. There are three tables: at the first table sit a historian, a philosopher 
and a theologian, at the second one an economist, a sociologist and a psychologist, and 
at the third one a judge, a solicitor and a public prosecutor. Assuming all else being 
equal (approachability, looks, gender etc.), which table is our law professor likely to 
join? 
This “cafeteria test” aims to illustrate the multiple identities of legal research as part 
of humanities, as part of social sciences, and as akin to the analysis of law in legal prac-
tice.1 This paper builds upon our previous work,2 where we used this “trichotomy” as a 
conceptual tool to explain the development of law schools and legal scholarship in the 
United Kingdom and suggested ways in which these concepts could be tested. By con-
trast, the current study has an empirical and comparative focus: here, we present the 
findings of a survey on the research methods identified by academic staff in five law 
schools, across Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (England and Scotland). 
The data was collected in autumn 2013 for the purpose of this paper. In the survey we 
also collected contextual information (e.g., training, career stage). Thus, it is our aim to 
explore both the relevance of the jurisdiction and law school in which the scholar works 
and more general factors that may determine preference for one or the other research 
methods. We also address recent trends, such as the impact of interdisciplinary thinking 
and the possible “globalization” of legal research.3 
The collected survey data will be evaluated in a quantitative way. In addition, as we 
asked respondents to provide comments in free text, these more qualitative responses 
will also be considered in some detail, in particular in order to understand the role of 
determinants such as training (or lack of training). Throughout this paper, we will also 
contextualize our findings with other primary and secondary materials. Thus, overall, 
our approach may be described as one of “triangulation”, namely that we use multiple 
sources and methods in order to get a fuller picture of the legal scholar’s preferences for 
or against particular methods. 
The corresponding structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 explains the meth-
od and conceptual framework of this paper, i.e. our survey method, the law schools 
studied and the three categories of legal research. Section 3 presents the main results for 
the five law schools by way of ternary plots. It also interprets these results based on in-
stitutional and country differences. Section 4 explores possible further determinants of 
research preferences. Here we analyse factors such as gender, age, education and sub-
ject matter of research. We also identify dominant and changing paradigms in the five 
law schools. Section 5 addresses the implications of our findings and Section 6 con-
cludes. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 For a detailed explanation of these categories see 3 c, below.  
2
 Mathias Siems and Daithí Mac Síthigh, “Mapping Legal Research”, 71 Cambridge Law Journal 651 
(2012). 
3
 See, e.g., Rob Van Gestel, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, and Miguel Poiares Maduro, “Methodology in the 
New Legal World”, EUI Working Papers LAW No. 2012/13, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2069872. 
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2. Method and conceptual framework 
 
This paper is based on a survey of academic staff at two German law school (Heinrich-
Heine University Düsseldorf and Bucerius Law School, Hamburg), two U.K. ones 
(University of East Anglia [UEA], Norwich, and University of Edinburgh) and one Irish 
one (Trinity College, University of Dublin4). The main survey question asked staff 
members to identify the frequency with which they use different methods of legal re-
search. It is the aim of this section to explain our survey approach as well as its underly-
ing conceptual framework. 
 
a) Units of comparison and respondents  
 
Our choice of universities and the corresponding countries has been based on substan-
tive but also personal reasons. Analysing three European countries reflects the current 
debate about research methods in Europe.5 It also has the advantage of a “controlled 
comparison” as far as it can be assumed that European legal cultures are relatively simi-
lar, as compared to non-European countries. This may be an obvious statement if one 
considers differences between European traditions and African or Asian indigenous and 
religious legal cultures, but there is also the view that there are stark differences be-
tween legal research methods in Europe and the United States. For instance, it can be 
argued that in the continental European civil law countries as well as the islands of the 
common law (England & Wales, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus) and the mixed legal system 
of Scotland a black letter approach to legal research is often still the dominant one. This 
is said to contrast with the U.S. elite law schools where the interdisciplinary approach 
has won the day, in particular the economic analysis of law and other research associat-
ed with the social sciences.6 In the present paper we contribute to this debate through 
providing empirical evidence for or against any similarity of research methods in four 
European jurisdictions. 
In these jurisdictions we examined five law schools. This approach may be contrast-
ed with one that would conduct a more general survey of all legal scholars. The justifi-
cation for our method is that we aim for a relatively detailed understanding of particular 
                                                 
4
 Trinity College is the single College of the University of Dublin, founded in 1592 by Charter as the 
“mother of a university” (mater universitatis) with the relationship between the University and College 
the subject of subsequent debate and litigation. See further David Allardice Webb and Robert Brendan 
McDowell, Trinity College Dublin: an academic history (Trinity College Dublin Press, 2004), 4. 
5
 See, e.g., Martijn Hesselink, “A European Legal Method? On European Private Law and Scientific 
Method”, 15 European Law Journal 20 (2009); Rob van Gestel and Jan Vranken, “Assessing Legal Re-
search: Sense and Nonsense of Peer Review versus Bibliometrics and the Need for a European Ap-
proach”, 12 German Law Journal 901 (2011); Rob van Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, “Why 
Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship”, 20 European Law Journal 292 (2014). 
6
 See, e.g., Martijn W. Hesselink, The New European Legal Culture (Deventer: Kluwer, 2001); Karl Rie-
senhuber, “English Common Law versus German Systemdenken? Internal versus External Approaches”, 7 
Utrecht Law Review 117 (2011); Kristoffel R. Grechenig and Martin Gelter, “The Transatlantic Diver-
gence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism”, 31 Hastings Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Review 295 (2008). But see also Carroll Seron, Susan Bibler Coutin, and 
Pauline White Meeusen, “Is There a Canon of Law and Society?”, 9 Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 287, 298 (2013) (noting the difference between internal and external perceptions of U.S. legal 
scholarship). 
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law schools. Thus, this is akin to “cluster sampling” in statistics.7 It is also related to 
ethnographic fieldwork as anthropologists may often study the population of specific 
locations in detail in order to understand the more general culture of a particular geo-
graphic area.  
In the present case, we have not only collected quantitative data, but have also asked 
legal scholars to self-assess their research and invite them to tell us more about the rea-
sons and influences, as well as change over time.8 This approach allows us to capture 
and explore different aspects of the academic career path and to use this evidence as the 
basis for highlighting the diversity of experiences and the degree of autonomy of indi-
vidual scholars. 
We chose these five law schools as they are research-focused, but not identical, for 
instance, in terms of age, size of the student body and esteem indicators.9 In addition, 
because of the relevance of context, we choose institutions that are known to us (at least 
one of us has worked or studied in each of the five law schools). This also meant that 
we could get a relatively high response rate. Furthermore, our approach fits within an 
established practice of “insider” research on academic life10 
The respondents of our survey were the research-active core members of staff of 
these five law schools. In respect of the United Kingdom and Ireland, we include all 
those whose job title is lecturer/assistant professor, senior lecturer, reader, associate pro-
fessor or professor, but exclude those designated as “adjunct” or “visiting”, as well as 
any other title (e.g., teaching fellow, research fellow). In the case of Germany, we in-
clude professors as well as research assistants who either have a PhD or a substantial 
contract of employment (at least 50 % of full-time). This was done as to exclude PhD 
students who only have a minor involvement, say, in teaching tutorials, and who may 
therefore be regarded as equivalent to teaching fellows at U.K. universities. These rules 
were applied both at the point of inviting participation and at confirmation of the final 
dataset. 
 
b) Procedure of data collection and survey method 
 
The data discussed in this paper were collected through a web-based survey, which was 
open during October 2013. The survey was first piloted with a small number of testers 
(who did not participate in the full survey) and amended for clarity before full release. 
In the actual survey, subjects were identified through the use of publicly available staff 
listings (as of 30 September 2013) and the application of consistent criteria, and con-
tacted through their institutional email address. Information on ethics and data protec-
tion was included and final explicit consent was sought at the point answers were sub-
mitted. In the invitation email and within the survey webpage we gave assurances that 
names would not be disclosed. Reminders were sent to those who had not responded 
and the survey was closed at the end of the month. 
                                                 
7
 Claus A. Moser and Graham Kalton. Survey Methods in Social Investigation (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
2nd ed., 1979), 100-6. 
8
 See also Appendix 2, below. 
9
 See 3 a, below. 
10
 E.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), 1-35 (justifying to study his own 
academic field, the French academia); Fiona Cownie, Legal Academics: Culture and Identities (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2004), 22-5 (on insider research of legal academia). 
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The survey was available in English for staff of the three institutions in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland and in German for the two German law schools. Minor customiza-
tions were made to reflect differences between jurisdictions and educational structure. 
For instance, two categories of “senior” and “junior” scholars were created, but ex-
pressed in language familiar to each higher education system, i.e. the ranks of lecturer, 
senior lecturer etc. for the U.K. and Irish universities and those of assistant and profes-
sor for the German ones. The precise text of both the invitation emails and the question-
naires is provided in the Appendix to this paper. 
In substance, the main aim was to identify the type of legal research method pre-
ferred by legal scholars. In this respect, we contemplated various options. First, we 
could have simply posed an open ended question, i.e. asking the respondents to describe 
in a free text the methods that they use. This may have been appropriate given that some 
legal scholars suggest that “legal science” is a “sui generis” discipline,11 distinct from 
the methods used in other parts of the university. In our questionnaire we provided a 
free text for further comments; however, we also felt that relying on unstructured re-
sponses alone may not have been very revealing. The responses may not have been easi-
ly comparable. Moreover, given the frequent lack of explicit recognition of methodolo-
gy,12 asking scholars to respond to one or more specific questions has the advantage that 
it encourages participation and reflection.  
Second, it would have been possible to ask specific questions about “objective” prox-
ies and then construct an index according to these responses. For example, such ques-
tions could have asked the respondents in which journals they publish, which journals 
they read, which academic associations they have joined, which conferences they attend 
etc. However, with this approach it would not have been easy to compare law schools 
across borders since legal journals, societies and other potential proxies are often specif-
ic to the jurisdiction or state in question. More fundamentally, such objective criteria 
suffer from the reverse problem as the first method, namely that they do not let the indi-
vidual scholar self-assess the methods that they use. 
As a result, we chose an intermediate approach, namely that we provided categories 
of legal research (based on our earlier work) and then asked respondents to indicate how 
far they felt that these reflected their own research methods. The respondents could also 
provide free text comments which about 50% of them did. This approach is in line with 
other studies. For example, in a recent study on property law, respondents were asked to 
self-assess their methods according to seven categories and to comment on “influence or 
pressure” from their employing institution.13 The categories that we used in the present 
paper were already alluded to in the introduction and will now be explained further.  
 
                                                 
11
 See, e.g., Jan M. Smits, The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2012), 9 (suggesting that this should research what “the law should be”); Jan M. Smits, “Law and Inter-
disciplinarity: On the Inevitable Normativity of Legal Studies”, 1 Critical Analysis of Law 75 (2014) 
(“question of what the law ought to be”). 
12
 Noted in van Gestel et al., supra note 3, at 23. See also Hervé Tijssen, De Juridische Dissertatie Onder 
de Loep: De Verantwoording van Methodologische Keuzes in Juridische Dissertaties (PhD Thesis 
Tilburg, 2009), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=94878 (inter alia, examining the justification 
of methods in 90 Dutch PhD theses in law). 
13
 Susan Bright and Sarah Blandy, “Survey of Property Law Academics relating to Research Approaches 
2013”, available at http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.302966!/file/PR-Survey-Report.pdf. 
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c) The three categories of legal research 
 
There is more than just one way to classify different types of legal research. For exam-
ple, it has been suggested to distinguish between internal and external methods of legal 
scholarship,14 between doctrinal, reform-oriented, and theoretical legal research,15 be-
tween micro- and macro legal research,16 or between hard and soft, and between pure 
and applied approaches of legal research.17 Following our previous research, this paper 
uses the categories of “law as humanities”, “law as social sciences” and “law as a prac-
tical discipline”.18 
The distinction between the humanities and the social sciences (in addition to the 
natural sciences) is common in the academic literature.19 For this project, we are inter-
ested in legal research that makes use of the methods of humanities or social sciences, 
not the substance of the research; we reiterated this point on the face of the survey itself. 
This can be understood through distinguishing between the use of the methods of a his-
torian (which would mean humanities) and the consideration of ancient cases (which 
would not necessarily mean this). A similar distinction is made in an article by Jane 
Baron where she distinguishes between “humanist” and “hermeneutic” law & litera-
ture.20 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that our survey concerns the methods of humanities 
or social sciences as used by legal scholars. Thus, we have not surveyed whether and 
how other disciplines may also engage in legal research – for example, as it has some-
times been argued that the field of “Law and Society” originated by social science 
scholarship outside the legal academia.21 It also clear that the use of particular methods 
of humanities or social sciences does not necessarily mean collaboration across disci-
plines. For example, it has recently been argued that socio-legal studies and the welfare 
state literature share many characteristics but that there is “a strange case of mutual ne-
glect between these two scholarly traditions”.22 
The category of “law as a practical discipline” reflects that some legal academics 
may be “academic lawyers” who share the ethics – and to some extent the methods, ad-
                                                 
14
 Richard L. Schwartz, “Internal and External Method in the Study of Law”, 11 Law and Philosophy 179 
(1992); Christopher McCruddden, “Legal Research and the Social Sciences”, 122 Law Quarterly Review 
632 (2006). 
15
 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, “Defining and Describing what we Do: Doctrinal Legal Re-
search”, 71 Deakin Law Review 83, 101 (2012) (with reference to the classification of the Australian 
Pearce Committee in 1987). 
16
 Mathias Siems, “Legal Originality”, 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 147 (2008). See also Will 
Rhee, “The Micro-Macro Legal Continuum and The Levels of Law”, 8 Socio-Legal Review 1 (2012). 
17
 Paul Chynoweth, “Legal research”, in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds.), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Built Environment (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 28. See also van Gestel and Mick-
litz, supra note 5, at 305 (law as an instrument for social engineering vs. intrinsic value of law).  
18
 For details and further references see Siems and Mac Síthigh, supra note 2, at 653-6. 
19
 See, e.g., Jerome Kagan, The Three Cultures Natural Sciences, Social Sciences and the Humanities in 
the 21st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
20
 Jane B. Baron, “Law, Literature and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity”, 108 Yale Law Journal 1059, 
1064-5 (1999) (“While humanist law-and-lits argue that lawyers should read literature, others, whom I 
shall call ‘hermeneutic’ law-and-lits, argue that lawyers should read literary theory”). 
21
 For this discussion see Seron et al., supra note 6, at 290-1. See also text accompanying note 120, below. 
22
 Daniel Wincott, “Images of welfare in law and society: the British welfare state in comparative per-
spective”, 38 Journal of Law and Society 343, 349 (2011).  
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justed for the requirements of an academic post – of practicing lawyers.23 Thus, these 
lawyers would mainly be interested in the substance and practical functioning of legal 
rules – as opposed to the scholarly “why questions”.24 This partly overlaps with doctri-
nal legal research, but the latter can also belong to “law as humanities”. For example, 
Mark Van Hoecke identifies legal doctrine “as a mainly hermeneutic discipline, with 
also empirical, argumentative, logical and normative elements”.25 Some of these ele-
ments have a practical dimension but deep hermeneutical reflections are closer to the 
humanities. 
In this respect, it is also clear that there can be differences between doctrinal scholars 
from different countries. Since the “law as a practical discipline” category refers to 
practicing lawyers of the jurisdiction in question, for example, it may matter that in 
Germany legal practitioners tend to be more “academic” than those in other countries 
(they often have a PhD in Law; they publish articles in law journals, contribute to books 
etc.). Similarly, the “humanities” dimension of doctrinal research may have different 
shades across countries: for example, in England, the long history of the common law 
may tend towards historical methods whereas the more conceptual thinking of civil law 
countries may invite the use of more philosophical methods.26 
In the actual questionnaire we phrased the categories as follows: 
 
“Please assume that there are three main methods of legal research: 
 Legal research as part of humanities, i.e. analysis of legal texts (cases, stat-
utes etc) using approaches similar to research in humanities (history, philos-
ophy, literature, theology, etc.) 
 Legal research as part of social sciences, i.e. analysis of law in its context, 
similar to research in social sciences (sociology, economics, psychology etc). 
 Legal research as akin to the analysis of law in legal practice, i.e. similar to 
the approaches used by legal practitioners (judges, solicitors etc.) 
In your current research how frequently do you use one of these three approach-
es? Please allocate in total 10 points (e.g., something like 5/5/0 or 3/3/4).  
Note that mixtures can be the result of a mix of these approaches in individual 
pieces or across various research outputs. Please also note that these categories 
refer to method not substance.” 
 
It can be seen that, on the one hand, the three categories are phrased in a generic lan-
guage in order not to impose a particular view on how social science, humanities and 
practical type legal research may be defined. On the other hand, the examples provided 
in brackets aim to ensure that all respondents will have sufficiently similar comparators, 
                                                 
23
 See Tony Becher, Academic Tribes and Territories, Intellectual Enquiry and the Cultures of Disci-
plines (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), 8, 30-1, 155. 
24
 See van Gestel et al., supra note 3, at 5 (difference between legal scholar and practitioner).  
25
 Mark Van Hoecke, “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?”, in Mark Van 
Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 1, 17. 
26
 For common and civil law see also 3 d (i), below. This may be tested with a so-called “vignette study”, 
i.e. to present respondents with hypotheticals and ask them to assess those in terms of the three categories. 
For such studies see generally e.g. Christiane Atzmüller and Peter M. Steiner, “Experimental Vignette 
Studies in Survey Research”, 6 European Journal of Research Methods for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences 128 (2010). 
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in terms of discipline (in the first two categories) and practitioners (in the third one) in 
mind when they answer the question.  
The survey question asks respondents to categorize their current research. This ap-
proach has the aim to identify patterns of self-identification, namely that it can show 
who, subjectively, each scholars regards as his or her closest associates, as illustrated by 
the “cafeteria test” of the introduction to this paper. Asking for such a subjective stance 
is not uncommon in social surveys.27 A possible objection can be that some respondents 
of such a survey may indicate a preference to a particular type of research because they 
perceive it to be of higher esteem. But, even if that were to be the case, we content that 
the aspirations and self-image of legal scholars, in terms of the research they would like 
to do, are relevant to a discussion of legal scholarship today.  
Moreover, we believe that the neutral language of the questions and the anonymous 
nature of the survey (and it being carried out for an academic project rather than, say, an 
internal review of research quality) has reduced this risk of such merely aspirational re-
sponses as far as feasible. The questions were intended to provoke descriptive responses 
regarding the methods used, rather than an assessment of quality. We also focused on 
methods rather than outputs, which necessarily requires attention to how scholars report 
their own activities. The approach we took (of asking respondents to classify their own 
methods) is, however, not without risk. Experimental research in psychology and other 
disciplines suggests, unsurprisingly, a tendency for respondents to overstate positive 
characteristics when asked to classify or rate themselves (as compared with third par-
ties), even when the risk of bias is specifically drawn to their attention.28 There can also 
be understatement where the assessment is perceived as being of a “difficult” task,29 
which could be a factor in relation to self-assessment of methods. We guarded against 
this through avoiding the use of language that suggests merit or virtue (or the oppo-
sites), and scrutinized free text comments for any evidence that this was a factor. It has 
also been argued that “overplacement” by participants is not as problematic as initially 
thought,30 that self-enhancing biases, while flawed, deserve study because of their con-
tribution to behavior,31 and that study of “possible selves” can be appropriate and re-
warding.32 As such, we contend that the results give a realistic depiction of methods 
used and believed to be used by the population studied. 
The possibility of mixtures in the survey question can also be related to the “cafeteria 
test”. For example, our law professor may work on various papers and for one paper she 
may like to get some feedback from social scientists but for another one from legal 
practitioners or humanities scholars. It could also be the case that she responds that she 
would like to talk to a mixed group, say, one judge, one economist and one historian: 
                                                 
27
 See, e.g., Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indices, http://cpi.transparency.org. 
28
 Emily Pronin, Daniel Yin and Lee Ross, “The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions Of Bias In Self Versus 
Others”, 28 Personal and Social Psychology Bulletin 369, 378 (2002). 
29
 Don Moore, “Not so Above Average After All: When People Believe They Are Worse Than Average 
and Its Implications for Theories of Bias in Social Comparison”, 102 Organizational Behavior and Hu-
man Decision Processes 42 (2007). 
30
 Jean-Pierre Benoit and Juan Dubra, “Apparent Overconfidence”, 79 Econometrica 1591 (2011). 
31
 Constantine Sedikides and Aiden Gregg, “Portraits Of The Self” in Michael Hogg and Joel Cooper 
(eds.), SAGE Handbook of Social Psychology (London: Sage, 2003). 
32
 See contributions in Curtis Denkel and Jennifer Kerpelman (eds.), Possible Selves: Theory, Research 
and Applications (New York: Nova, 2006). 
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again, then, this would indicate that this professor would presumably assign intermedi-
ate scores for each of the three categories.  
 
 
3. Main results for five law schools in four jurisdictions 
 
As the previous section explained, our empirical study focussed on five law schools in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Ireland. This section presents the main results. It 
starts with summary information on these law schools. We then present and interpret 
our results, based on institutional and country differences. The anonymized data collect-
ed in the survey are available at an accompanying project website.33 
 
 
a) The five law schools and its academic staff 
 
The schools vary in age, institutional mission, jurisdiction, and other features. Table 1 
provides an overview of these differences, identified at the time of the survey in Octo-
ber 2013.  
 
                  Table 1: Summary information on the law schools of this study  
 
 Coun-
try 
Law 
school 
approx. 
student # 
Law school 
academic 
staff # (and 
responses) 
Institution 
(and law 
school) 
age 
Structure of 
law school 
within uni-
versity 
Esteem  
indicators34 
Bu-
cerius 
Ger-
many 
960 max. 94 
(14) 
2000 Law-only 
private uni-
versity 
Top 10 in German 
law school rank-
ings35 
Düs-
seldorf 
Ger-
many 
1200 max. 118 
(23) 
1965 
(1993) 
Faculty of 
Law 
Above average in 
CHE ranking for 
German law 
schools36 
Edin-
burgh 
U.K. 
(Scot-
land) 
1500 60 (42) 1583 
(1707) 
College of 
Humanities 
& Social 
Sciences 
Member of Russell 
Group and Coimbra 
Group; law school 
ranked in top 10 of 
RAE 200837 
                                                 
33
 See http://www.mappingmethods.blogspot.com/. 
34
 For the contentious role of rankings see Rob van Gestel, “Sense and Non-sense of a European Ranking 
of Law Schools and Law Journals”, 35 Legal Studies 165 (2015). 
35
 http://www.law-school.de/rankings.html?&L=0 
36
 http://ranking.zeit.de/che2013/. 
37
 http://www.ed.ac.uk/about/mission-governance/affiliations; http://www.ed.ac.uk/about/edinburgh-
global/partnerships/global-networks; http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/research/rae2008.aspx.  
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UEA U.K. 
(Eng-
land) 
600 32 (19) 1963 
(1977) 
Faculty of 
Social Sci-
ences 
Top 20 in Times 
Higher Education 
2013 global ranking 
of “under 50” uni-
versities38 
Dublin Ireland 1000 22 (13) 1592 
(1740) 
Faculty of 
Arts, Hu-
manities & 
Social Sci-
ences 
Highest ranked 
Irish university; 
member of Coim-
bra Group39  
 
In online surveys it is often difficult to achieve a decent response rate.40 In this respect, 
the information on the numbers of academic staff and their responses in Table 1 requires 
further explanation. With respect to the two German law schools, we aimed to include 
professors as well as research assistants who either have a PhD or a substantial contract 
of employment (at least 50 % of full-time), in order to achieve reasonable comparability 
with the grade of Lecturer and above in the United Kingdom and Ireland.41 However, 
the university websites do not indicate the type of employment contract; many of the 
research assistants that we contacted (the “max.” numbers in Table 1) may not have 
been eligible for this study. If one considers only those who we know to be eligible (the 
professors and assistants who already have a PhD), the response rates were 37% and 
32% for the two German law schools.42 With respect to other three law schools, the re-
sponse rates were even higher: 70% for Edinburgh and 59% for Dublin and UEA. Thus, 
overall, the response rates are very good, as compared with other studies in this field.43 
Half of the respondents also provided comments in the free text field of the survey.44 
 
b) Visual presentation of main results 
 
There are different ways of presenting the data collected in our survey. A simple way of 
comparing the research preferences between the five law schools is to calculate the 
arithmetic means and present those in a bar chart: 
 
                                                 
38
 http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2013/one-hundred-under-fifty.  
39
 http://www.tcd.ie/about/facts/; http://www.tcd.ie/globalrelations/global-reach/. 
40
 See, e.g., Mick P. Couper and Michael Bosnjak, “Internet surveys”, in Peter V. Marsden and James D. 
Vright (eds.), Handbook of Survey Research (Bingley: Emerald, 2nd ed. 2010), 536-8 (noting the particu-
lar challenges of achieving high response rates for online surveys). 
41
 See 2 a, above. 
42
 The precise numbers are 11 out of 30 for Bucerius and 9 out of 28 for Düsseldorf. 
43
 See, e.g., Duncan D. Nulty, “The Adequacy of Response Rates to Online and Paper Surveys: What Can 
be Done?”, 33 Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education 301, 303 (2008) (citing eight studies with 
an average response rate of 33%); Willem van Boom and Rob van Gestel, “Rechtswetenschappelijk 
onderzoek – Uitkomsten van een landelijke enquête”, Nederlands Juristenblad (2015) web-version avail-
able at http://njb.nl/Uploads/2015/5/Van-Boom-en-Van-Gestel-2015.pdf (response rates between 13 and 
29% for survey at all ten Dutch law schools).  
44
 These comments are also available on the project website, supra note 33, and they reflect the diverse 
research preferences as discussed in the following. 
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                    Figure 1: Research methods per university 
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The problem with Figure 1 is, however, that it does not show the individual responses 
and the corresponding spread of the data. Thus, as already explained in our previous 
work, it is also useful to visually represent the relative presence of the three broad cate-
gories through “ternary plots”.45 The ternary plot, most familiar in the sciences, is an 
adaption of a Cartesian diagram for the particular circumstances of “three dimensional” 
responses or observations. While we explore the data in more detail in this section (by 
institution) and in section 4 (in terms of demographics), the ternary plot allows the read-
er to view the positioning of all respondents with ease, and assists with the identification 
of broad trends or themes.  
The following diagrams of Figure 2 include all responses, with larger markings indi-
cating more than one respondent with identical responses The arithmetic mean is identi-
fied as blue circles. We also highlight, in red stars, the “centre” of the dataset. The esti-
mated centre, calculated with the compositional data analysis software CoDaPack, may 
be more appropriate than the mean for the particular data we have collected and the ge-
ometric form in which it is presented.46 Although the means and centers are closely 
aligned in our results, the mean is more affected by outlying results – for instance, the 
cluster of “social science only” respondents in Edinburgh pulled the mean away from 
the core of responses. 
 
                                                 
45
 Siems and Mac Síthigh, supra note 2, at 668-9.  
46
 John Aitchison, “A concise guide to compositional data analysis” (2005), available at 
http://ima.udg.edu/activitats/codawork05/A_concise_guide_to_compositional_data_analysis.pdf at p. 49; 
Glòria Mateu-Figueras et al, “The principle of working on coordinates”, in Vera Pawlowsky-Glahn and 
Antonella Buccianti (eds.), Compositional Data Analysis: Theory and Applications (Chichester: Wiley, 
2011), 40. For these calculations some adjustment of the “zero” responses was necessary. As in the pre-
sent case those can be treated as “rounded zeros”, we replaced them with the value “0.25” (the average 
between 0.00..1 and 0.499..) and made corresponding changes to other values. This procedure is based on 
Josep A. Martin-Fernandez, Carles Barcelo-Vidal, and Vera Pawlowsky-Glahn, “Dealing With Zeros and 
Missing Values in Compositional Data Sets Using Nonparametric Imputation”, 35 Mathematical Geology 
253 (2003). 
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                 Figure 2: Research preferences of academics in five law schools 
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Compositional statistics also allows for the calculation of the spread of the data, known 
as the CLR variance (“centered log-ratio transformation”). This is the equivalent to cal-
culating the standard deviations in classical statistics. 
 
                        Table 2: CLR variances for the five law schools 
 
 humanities 
social sci-
ences 
practical le-
gal research 
total vari-
ance 
Bucerius 0.44 0.45 0.39 1.27 
Düsseldorf 0.74 0.57 0.60 1.90 
Edinburgh 0.75 1.03 0.79 2.57 
UEA 0.71 0.80 0.79 2.31 
Dublin 0.47 0.48 0.42 1.37 
All law schools 0.73 0.84 0.79 2.37 
 
Table 2 shows that the two schools in the United Kingdom have “more variance” – as 
we discuss below. The high value for social science variance in the same schools, as 
compared with the other three schools, reflects what is visible on the ternary plots – a 
group of respondents who identify strongly with social science (exclusively or to a very 
great extent). However, in all cases, the variance data demonstrates how the humanities 
category is more widely accepted (or less unusual) than that for social sciences. 
 
c) Interpretation based on institutional differences 
 
The findings can be contextualized by considering the focus of the law schools we stud-
ied. This focus is identified, first and foremost, from the public documents of the school 
and (where relevant) the institution in which it is located. Some of this information is 
presented in Table 1, above. 
We note general consistency with the reputation or priorities of the schools. Starting 
with Germany, the traditional system of publicly funded universities means that German 
universities are relatively similar: all of them have decent resources but without some of 
them being “global elite universities”.47 Correspondingly, the law faculty of the Univer-
sity of Düsseldorf can be seen as a relatively typical German law school. The predomi-
nant mix of practical and humanities-influenced legal research is a general feature of 
German legal scholarship.48 The law school’s website shows, on the one hand, the tradi-
tional focus of a German law school on preparing students for the First Exam (which 
can mainly be associated with the practical dimension).49 On the other hand, infor-
mation on international collaborations, various research centers and specialized master 
degrees50 indicates that the law school has also developed a wider range of activities. 
                                                 
47
 By way of illustration see U21 Ranking of National Higher Education Systems 2014, available at 
http://www.universitas21.com/RelatedFile/Download/589 where Germany ranks 14 out of 50 countries 
and the THE World University Rankings, available at http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-
university-rankings/2013-14/world-ranking where there is no German university in the top 50. 
48
 See 3 d, below. 
49
 http://www.jura.hhu.de/studium.html. 
50
 See http://www.jura.hhu.de/internationales.html, http://www.jura.hhu.de/forschung/forschung-an-den-
instituten.html, http://www.duslaw.de/studiengaenge-llm.html. 
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With respect to Bucerius Law School, our survey data show that the practical catego-
ry is the main subject of emphasis. This is in line with the fact that Bucerius, as a private 
law school, collaborates closely with law firms, setting out in its mission statement how 
“the course of studies is based on a unity of teaching and research, and merges the needs 
of the practicing legal community with an academic pervasion of the law” and acknowl-
edging how “donations from private sponsors are a sign of the society’s confidence in 
the Law School”;51 some facilities are named after major law firms. It is also important 
to note that undergraduate students pay tuition fees at Bucerius, unlike students at most 
German public universities. As a result, students expect to receive an excellent and 
“practical” legal education,52 in order to get into the top jobs in legal practice after grad-
uation. This may also have a side-effect on the practical research focus at Bucerius.53 
The survey results for Edinburgh and UEA are relatively mixed as regards the pref-
erences for particular research methods. This is in line with a statement on Edinburgh’s 
website which identifies as its first core strategic objective the building of “a research 
profile of depth and breadth which has demonstrable and transformative impact (aca-
demic, legal and social)”.54 Yet, it is also worth noting that, according to our findings, 
Edinburgh only has a relatively small number of scholars who identify their research as 
falling within our “practical” category. This may reflect the nature of one of the top ten 
U.K. law schools where practical legal research is often seen as not “original” enough, 
in particular for the purposes of the U.K. Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs, now 
REFs).55 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that, unlike the other three law schools, Edinburgh 
and UEA have a good number of scholars that associate themselves with the social sci-
ences. This reflects the existence of clusters or centers explicitly framed in relation to 
the social sciences at both of these law schools.56 It is also in line with some of the pro-
grams they offer: Edinburgh’s interest in criminology supports an MSc in this field and 
UEA offers a Masters in Research in “social science research methods” as well as de-
grees in obviously interdisciplinary areas such as competition and media. 
Social science methods appear less prominent in Dublin than in the two U.K. institu-
tions. Although the response rate was lower here, the results are not entirely unexpected. 
Legal education in Ireland has long been closely linked with the small, self-employed 
Bar. In some universities, many full-time members of academic staff will continue to 
practice law, and the value of practical and clinical training within undergraduate legal 
education has been reasserted, although managerial approaches to workload are making 
it more difficult for full-time academic staff to practice law.57 Trinity College itself is 
identified with performing particularly well in rankings that concentrate on “arts and 
humanities”.58  
                                                 
51
 http://www.law-school.de/leitbild.html?&L=1. 
52
 See also Christoph Luschin, “A German Ivy? The Bucerius Law School”, 19 Southwestern Journal of 
International Law 1 (2012). 
53
 The relationship between teaching and research preferences is also discussed in 3 d (ii), below.  
54
 http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/other_areas_of_interest/about/about_edinburgh_law_school/strategy_and_vision. 
55
 For the RAEs see also 3 d (ii), below. 
56
 At Edinburgh, the Criminology group since the 1970s (http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/criminology/); at 
UEA, the ESRC-funded Centre for Competition Policy (http://www.competitionpolicy.ac.uk).  
57
 Marie-Luce Paris and Lawrence Donnelly, “Legal Education in Ireland: A Paradigm Shift to the Practi-
cal?”, 11 German Law Journal 1067, 1079 (2010). 
58
 https://www.tcd.ie/Communications/news/news.php?headerID=1872&vs_date=2011-6-1.  
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d) Interpretation based on country differences  
 
It is also possible to relate our findings to differences between the countries of our 
study. The two German law schools show a mixture of practical and humanities related 
legal research. Yet the humanities focus is strong across all the schools we studied, for 
instance also in Dublin, thus, possibly reflecting the European approach to law as hu-
manities more generally. The two U.K. law schools show the greatest internal diversity, 
possibly due to the major changes that have happened across the U.K. universities in the 
last quarter-century, as the following will explain. 
 
(i) The role of legal families 
 
The most intuitive reason for these differences may be that legal systems and methods 
are very different, perhaps because there is a deep divide between common and civil 
law countries. The European scope of our study does not enable us to provide a general 
answer to the relevance of legal family classifications. Indeed, previous research59 has 
found that today U.S. law and legal culture is very different from both the United King-
dom and continental Europe. Still, of course, there may also be differences within Eu-
rope. Although ideas do indeed travel, especially as joint projects are increasingly fa-
vored in funding systems (e.g. requirements for cross-border collaboration in EU-
funded schemes), differences in legal thinking persist. 
For example, primers on legal research for postgraduate and doctoral students 
demonstrate how those groups are introduced to legal skills and aspects of (legal) phi-
losophy in Germany.60 On the contrary, similar texts for U.K. researchers include a mix-
ture of methods: historical, comparative, doctrinal, socio-legal, and quantitative.61 This 
itself is a development; as our respondents – in the free text of our survey – told us that 
the lack of social science training in the past continues to inhibit even successful, mid-
career scholars from making use of these methods.62 
We may also need to consider that the United Kingdom is not a uniform legal sys-
tem, and that Scotland is sometimes seen as belonging to a separate “mixed legal fami-
ly”.63 Having asked Edinburgh respondents whether they have received their under-
graduate training in Scotland or elsewhere, we could calculate that the arithmetic means 
within the sub-category of Scots lawyers from Edinburgh (15 respondents) are 43% for 
                                                 
59
 See references in supra note 6. 
60
 E.g., Karl Larenz and Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (Berlin: Springer 
3rd ed. 1995); Bernd Rüthers, Christian Fischer and Axel Birk, Rechtstheorie: mit Juristischer 
Methodenlehre (Munich: Beck, 7th ed. 2013). 
61
 E.g., Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds.), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 2007); Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds.), Research Methods in Law (London: 
Routledge 2013). 
62
 Respondents EDI 15, EDI 21, TCD 9. For similar assessments see Michael Adler and Jonathan Simon, 
“Stepwise Progression: The Past, Present, and Possible Future of Empirical Research on Law in the Unit-
ed States and the United Kingdom”, 41 Journal of Law and Society 173, 188-191 (2014); Hazel Genn et 
al., Law in the Real World: Improving our Understanding of How Law Works (2006), available at 
http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/nuffield-inquiry-empirical-legal-research-law-real-world.  For the role 
of education see also 4 a (ii), below. 
63
 For the debate see, e.g., Sue Farran, “Scots Law: A System in Search of a Family?”, 61 Northern Ire-
land Legal Quarterly 311 (2010). 
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law as humanities, 36% for law as social sciences and 15% for practical legal research. 
This is fairly close to the overall Edinburgh data for all 42 staff members:64 thus, this 
suggests that, in terms of these three general legal methods, Scotland is not very differ-
ent from the rest of the United Kingdom. 
 
(ii) Further factors, in particular higher education 
 
According to Tony Becher, even where the subject matter of particular fields appears to 
be global (e.g., in physics or engineering) “geographical variation” of disciplines still 
exists as the methods of researchers may reflect “identifiable features of a particular so-
ciety, such as its education system or its level of economic development”.65 Even more 
so, this is likely to be the case in legal scholarship where such factors may complement 
differences in legal culture and style. In the following, we cannot identify all cultural, 
psychological, social, political, economic or other factors which may determine why, 
say, the average English and German scholar do legal research in a different way. Ra-
ther, the following will focus on factors of higher education as these have been particu-
lar controversial in recent years.  
University structures do differ between institutions. In Germany, Immanuel Kant re-
ferred to law as being, along with medicine and theology, one of the three “higher facul-
ties”.66 But in the United Kingdom, the “predominant notion of academic lawyers is that 
they are not really academic”.67 Is this still a fair summary, now that legal scholars are 
subject to the same research assessments and research-focused promotion criteria as 
other academics, and often share faculties and research council budgets with them? 
Incentive structures have not converged. Differences between the governance and 
funding of institutions between countries may relate to research. In the United King-
dom, for example, both the funding and the reputation of an institution will be affected 
by the external review of the quality of the research outputs of its staff, in the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF; until 2014 called RAE, Research Assessment Exercise), 
where work is evaluated against criteria of significance, originality and rigour.68 In the 
free text some of our respondents also made explicit reference to the importance of the 
REF for changes in legal scholarship, appearing to assume that these criteria are more 
obviously met in the case of work in humanities and in particular social science: one of 
them proposed that approaches beyond “black letter domestic” made it more likely that 
such work would be reviewed at the valued levels of 3* and 4* under the REF, and an-
other pointed to the “positive” impact of the REF in promoting quality and thus a move 
towards humanities and social science approaches over time.69 
In Ireland, on the contrary, there is no equivalent system.70 Nor is there one in Ger-
many: academics are required to produce internal reports about research activity, but 
                                                 
64
 See b, above. 
65
 Becher, supra note 23, at 21-2. 
66
 Immanuel Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten (1789) – English translation by Mary J. Gregor, The Conflict 
of the Faculties (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 1992). 
67
 Becher, supra note 23, at 30. 
68
 http://www.ref.ac.uk/. See also Cownie, supra note 10, at 135-8 (RAE effect, as “increasingly important 
place of research in the culture of academic law”). 
69
 Respondents UEA 16, EDI 23. 
70
 Key Perspectives Ltd, “A Comparative Review of Research Assessment Regimes in Five Countries and 
the Role of Libraries in the Research Assessment Process” (2009), available at 
 18
professors in publicly-funded institutions enjoy strong protection against the termination 
of their employment. This is stronger than is the case in the United Kingdom, where the 
Education Reform Act 1988 provides for the amendment of university statutes so as to 
allow dismissal of academic staff on the grounds of redundancy or good cause (s. 203). 
More recently, institutions have made use of “teaching-only contracts” and redeployed 
staff considered to be performing less effectively in research (especially with a view to 
the REF) to these contracts, or advertized more of these positions than before.71 
Previous research has also pointed to variation between countries in the form and po-
sition of disciplinary boundaries. It is argued that, despite some convergence as a con-
sequence of the Bologna Process and world and EU trade law, German and U.K. higher 
education systems still differ in their approach to the vocational dimension and to 
basic/applied research – and the fates of the social sciences and humanities are different 
as a result.72 None of the countries we considered take the Swedish approach of defining 
at a national level the disciplines that are part of the social sciences or humanities, and 
so the autonomy of German, U.K. and Irish institutions means that there can be varia-
tion across institutions, as well as across countries.73 
Our focus in this paper is on legal research. However, the approach of an institution 
to teaching also makes a difference – such as in choosing who to appoint and whether to 
promote a member of staff. The development of research methodologies, therefore, may 
compete for attention with responses to other incentives (e.g., the development of new 
courses, taking on administrative roles). There is clear potential for tension between re-
search and teaching,74 although the separation of function that has emerged in the Unit-
ed States (where much teaching may be “outsourced”, in some institutions, to adjunct 
professors and temporary staff) is less obvious in the countries we have considered in 
this study.75  
The tension between teaching and research is likely to be more pronounced in the 
United Kingdom than in the other countries of this study. Due to the RAEs/REFs, the 
claim that “in Common Law countries (...) most full-time professors think of themselves 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.oclc.org/content/dam/research/publications/library/2009/2009-09.pdf?urlm=162926, at pp. 
23-26. 
71
 See, e.g., Paul Jump, “Swansea’s tough REF plans provoke disquiet” (Times Higher Education 5 Sep-
tember 2013) (commenting on the proposed move of staff without  four 3* publications from a contract 
with 6 hours per week of teaching to one with 18 hours); Anna Fazackerley, “University reputation: will 
teachers pay the price?” (The Guardian 30 April 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/apr/29/university-research-funding-harms-teaching (review-
ing different positions taken by U.K. institutions on the consequences of non-submission to the REF for 
academic staff contracts). 
72
 Rebecca Krebs and Silke Wenk, “Disciplinary barriers between the social sciences and humanities” 
(2005), available at 
http://www.york.ac.uk/res/researchintegration/ComparativeReports/Comparative_Report_Construction_o
f_Knowledge.pdf at pp. 7-11. 
73
 Ursula Apitzsch and Irini Siouti, “Comparative report on the infrastructural definitions of the humani-
ties and social sciences in eight European countries” (2005), available at 
http://www.york.ac.uk/res/researchintegration/ComparativeReports/Comparative_Report_Infrastructural_
Definitions.pdf. 
74
 van Gestel and Micklitz, supra note 5, at 300.  
75
 For the discussion about such a split see Mathias Siems, “A World Without Law Professors”, in Mark 
Van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 71-86. 
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mainly as teachers rather than scholars”,76 is certainly not accurate any more for Eng-
land and other parts of the United Kingdom. Thus, U.K. legal scholars may often feel 
that, for their research, they should not be “too practical” as this may not help one’s ac-
ademic career, while in their teaching they should not be “too theoretical” lest students 
complain that they do not get “value for money” given the constant rise in student tui-
tion fees.77 In Germany, by contrast, the more practical research focus means that this 
tension is less pronounced. Moreover, the fact that the Final Exam is predominantly 
managed by the Ministries of Justice (not the universities)78 further stimulates the fre-
quent emphasis on practical legal knowledge. 
 
 
4. Possible determinants of research preferences 
 
The previous section highlighted the country and institutional differences between the 
law schools of our study. In this section, we consider the role of various themes that 
may shape the research preferences of individual academics. In particular, we analyze 
factors such as gender, age, education and subject matter of research (see a, below). We 
also identify dominant and changing paradigms in the five law schools (see b, below). 
Despite the aim to identify possible determinants, this paper does not use tools of in-
ferential statistics, such as regression analysis. In the present context, it is often difficult 
to identify a clear unidirectional causal relationship: for example, if it were found that 
private lawyers had a preference for practical legal research, this would not necessarily 
mean that doing research on private law leads to a more practical approach, because it 
could also be the case that scholars who prefer to do practical legal approach then de-
cide to do focus on topics of private law. There may also be cases where the decision to 
enter the academic career in law is dependent on whether one’s preferred method of re-
search is accepted in a particular market: for example, if persons with a degree from an-
other discipline are less likely to associate with a practical approach, a market where the 
latter is dominant may see few of those academics. 
As previously explained,79 it is the general aim of this paper to provide a nuanced 
picture of the situation in a small number of law schools familiar to us. In the following 
section we also present some aggregates of the five law schools. This may invite the re-
sponse that these five units are not a representative sample, say, of law schools in Eu-
rope, or representative of the country in which they are located. To reflect this point, the 
following will also report to what extent a particular result holds for all of the five law 
schools, or whether there may be an outlier. 
 
                                                 
76
 David S. Clark, “The Organization of Lawyers and Judges” in Mauro Cappelletti (ed.), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, volume 16 (Tübingen: Mohr 2002) para. 56. 
77
 Similar the assessment by Hilary Somerlad et al., The Futures of Legal Education and the Legal Pro-
fession (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015), 14 (“in essence the law school curriculum remains doctrinal and 
traditional”). For the fee structure in U.K. universities see http://www.ucas.com/how-it-all-works/student-
finance/undergraduate-student-finance.  
78
 According to §5d(2) of the German Judiciary Act (Richtergesetz) this concerns 70% of the First Exam, 
while 30% of this exam is set by the universities. 
79
 See 2 a, above. 
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a) Analysis of possible general determinants  
 
The survey, underlying this paper, not only identified preferences in research methods, 
but asked respondents to provide information on a number of further personal character-
istics.80 Table 3 reports the results across the five law schools. The shadings highlight 
law schools that are 10% above or below the percentages of the “Total” column. 
 
         Table 3: Variables (absolute counts, and % of respondents of each law school) 
 
  Bucerius Düsseldorf Edinburgh UEA Dublin Total 
Gender Male 11 18 22 13 5 69 
  78.6% 78.3% 52.4% 68.4% 38.5% 62.2% 
 Female 3 5 20 6 8 42 
  21.4% 21.7% 47.6% 31.6% 61.5% 37.8% 
Age ≤35 7 14 12 8 3 44 
  50.0% 60.9% 28.6% 42.1% 23.1% 39.6% 
 36-49 5 5 19 8 8 45 
  35.7% 21.7% 45.2% 42.1% 61.5% 40.5% 
 ≥50 2 4 11 3 2 22 
  14.3% 17.4% 26.2% 15.8% 15.4% 19.8% 
Rank Junior staff 7 16 20 10 5 58 
  50.0% 69.6% 47.6% 52.6% 38.5% 52.3% 
 Senior staff 7 7 22 9 8 53 
  50.0% 30.4% 52.4% 47.4% 61.5% 47.7% 
Practice  Yes 9 12 11 6 9 47 
(domestic)  64.3% 52.2% 26.2% 31.6% 69.2% 42.3% 
 No 5 11 31 13 4 64 
  35.7% 47.8% 73.8% 68.4% 30.8% 57.7% 
Degree in  Yes 2 4 11 6 1 24 
other disci-  14.3% 17.4% 26.2% 31.6% 7.7% 21.6% 
pline No 12 19 31 13 12 87 
  85.7% 82.6% 73.8% 68.4% 92.3% 78.4% 
PhD in law Yes 9 13 27 13 11 73 
  64.3% 56.5% 64.3% 68.4% 84.6% 65.8% 
 No 5 10 15 6 2 38 
  35.7% 43.5% 35.7% 31.6% 15.4% 34.2% 
Type Private law 8 10 12 8 4 42 
  57.1% 43.5% 28.6% 42.1% 30.8% 37.8% 
 Public law 5 12 20 6 5 48 
                                                 
80
 See 2 b, above and Appendix 2, below. Although some of this information could have been gathered 
from university websites, we could not be certain that the websites were up to date, and important data 
was either unavailable (e.g. age) or incomplete (e.g. all qualifications). 
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  35.7% 52.2% 47.6% 31.6% 38.5% 43.2% 
 Mixed 1 1 10 5 4 21 
  7.1% 4.3% 23.8% 26.3% 30.8% 18.9% 
Jurisdiction Domestic law 6 17 6 6 6 41 
  42.9% 73.9% 14.3% 31.6% 46.2% 36.9% 
 Int’l, European or  4 1 19 6 4 34 
 comparative law 28.6% 4.3% 45.2% 31.6% 30.8% 30.6% 
 Mixed 4 5 17 7 3 36 
  28.6% 21.7% 40.5% 36.8% 23.1% 32.4% 
 
This table shows some interesting differences. For example, the fact that there are rela-
tively few female legal scholars in the two German law schools may reflect the fact that 
in Germany, until around ten years ago, men were considerably more likely to study law 
than women.81 Given the different structure of universities,82 the two German law 
schools also have more young staff members than the three other law schools. In terms 
of qualifications, it is notable that in the two U.K. law schools relatively few staff mem-
bers have a qualification to practice law, possibly reflecting the impact of the research 
assessment exercises,83 and that in Dublin relatively few staff members have a degree in 
another discipline but more than in the other law schools a PhD in law (pointing, with 
due caution because of the response rate, to a shift towards an academic approach but 
not to the wider interdisciplinary changes visible in the neighboring jurisdictions). With 
respect to the United Kingdom, it may be noted that almost all of the younger scholars 
tend to have a PhD (or are about to complete it), whereas some of the senior scholars 
entered legal academia at a time when it was still common to pursue a career in legal 
scholarship without a PhD.84 
In terms of subject matter specialization, it can be seen that in the two German law 
schools almost all of the respondents clearly indicated that they belong to either private 
or public law whereas in the three British and Irish law schools, mixtures are more 
common. The likely explanation is that in the common law world the divide between 
public and private law is of more recent origin.85 Finally, there are some interesting dif-
ferences in terms of domestic or international law focus. The two U.K. universities have 
the lowest number of “pure” domestic scholars which is the likely to be the result of a 
relatively open international market for academic appointments.86 Edinburgh in particu-
                                                 
81
 See data on law graduates, available at https://www.uni-due.de/isa/fg_wirtschaft_recht/rechts-
wiss/rechtswiss_mw_frm.htm. 
82
 See Academic career maps in Europe, at http://www.leru.org/index.php/public/extra/careermapseurope. 
83
 See 3 d (ii), above. See also Patricia Leighton, Tony Mortimer and Nicola Whatley, Today’s Law 
Teachers: Lawyers or Academics? (London: Cavendish, 1995), 19-20 (large-scale study carried out by 
Anglia Polytechnic University in 1995 found that fewer than half of all law teachers, including university 
degrees and professional courses, in the United Kingdom had significant experience of legal practice). 
84
 For the past situation see, e.g., Becher, supra note 23, at 108 (in the early 1980s in one of the leading 
law faculties only 5 out of 32 PhD graduates). 
85
 See, e.g., Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014), 49. 
86
 See Chistopher McCrudden, “A Comment on the Use of Foreign Professors in the German Council of 
Science and Humanities Report” (20 February 2014), available at http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/a-
comment-on-the-use-of-foreign-professors-in-the-german-council-of-science-and-humanities-report-
prospects-of-legal-scholarship-in-germany-current-situation-analyses-recommendations/. 
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lar contains few “pure” domestic scholars which may also reflect the strong interest in 
comparative approaches in a small legal system sometimes considered as a mixture be-
tween common and civil law.87 By contrast, Düsseldorf has a strong focus on domestic 
law, possibly reflecting the importance of the centralized final exam which mainly fo-
cuses on domestic law,88 
The following presents the arithmetic means of the three research methods, distin-
guished by those variables. It would also be possible to display the “centres” but, as we 
have seen previously, in our case, this leads to similar results.89 
 
(i) Personal characteristics 
 
Figure 3: Research preferences per gender, age and rank 
 
 
The ternary plot in Figure 3 shows that, in average, female scholars are closer to the so-
cial sciences than male scholars, whereas male scholars are closers to the other two cat-
egories. What may explain this gender difference? It may matter that, in the past, “law” 
has been a discipline where a clear majority of scholars were men.90 Thus, women who 
join law schools may felt the need to find a “niche” since it may have been difficult to 
get into the existing male networks of traditional doctrinal scholars, i.e. those predomi-
nantly associated with practical legal scholarship and law as humanities.91 
In terms of age and rank, it is most interesting to see that younger and early-career 
scholars tend to be more “practical”. This may be counterintuitive given evidence from 
the United States that new fields, such as “law and” scholarship, are preferred by 
                                                 
87
 See 3 d (i), above. 
88
 See 3 c, above. 
89
 See 3 b, above. 
90
 See, e.g., for the United Kingdom, Cownie, supra note 10, at 168-75; Clare McGlynn, The Woman 
Lawyer: Making the Difference (London: Butterworths, 1998). For Germany see note 80, above. 
91
 For the trend towards law as a social science, see also b (ii), below. 
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younger academics.92 Yet, in our case, it may reflect that younger scholars received 
their legal training recently and that this is usually of a black-letter nature in the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Germany. Thus, legal scholars may only adopt a more interdisci-
plinary perspective later on in their academic career. This can also be seen in some of 
the comments we received in our survey. Those included the lack of formal training in 
social science and how this inhibits the use of such methods (respondents from Scotland 
and Germany)93, even though “there might be occasions where it might be helpful” (re-
spondent from Ireland).94 Several respondents indicated how the influence of interdisci-
plinary collaboration, for example in a research centre, has accounted for a later shift 
towards social sciences.95 A respondent from Germany also explained that classical 
methods tend to become less exciting as you progress with your research, and, similarly, 
one from England indicated that he “increasingly found ‘pure’ doctrinal law a little dull 
– and limiting in so far as there is a finite stock of material, albeit changing over 
time“.96 
The fact that Figure 3 shows differences between junior and senior academics may, 
in the words of Tony Becher, show the “familiar contest of the Young Turks against the 
Old Guard”.97 Here, then, the senior academics may be in a stronger position, as dis-
cussed in Pierre Bourdieu’s study dealing with the “power and prestige” in the “aca-
demic field” in France. In particular, Bourdieu uses the notion of “academic capital” 
being “obtained and maintained by holding a position enabling domination of other po-
sitions and their holders”, which he also links to age.98 
In the present context, however, it also needs to be considered that the differences 
between the categories in the ternary plot may be regarded as relatively small, and that 
the age group of 50 or older is positioned between the other two groups. In addition, the 
ternary plot just indicated the mean, not the spread of the data. To identify the latter, it is 
possible to calculate the confidence intervals of the categories.99 
 
                                                 
92
 William Landes and Richard Posner, “Heavily Cited Articles in Law”, 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
825, 836 (1996). 
93
 Respondents EDI 15, EDI 21, BUC 9. 
94
 Respondent TCD 2. 
95
 Respondents HHU 4, EDI 9, UEA 12. 
96
 Respondents BUC 13, UEA 18 
97
 Becher, supra note 23, at 72. 
98
 Bourdieu, supra note 10, at 84, 87. See also Becher, supra note 23, at 58 (with the heading “Great men, 
gatekeepers and the exercise of power”). 
99
 This uses a function provided by CoDaPack (see 3 b, above). 
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Figure 4: 90% and 95 % centre confidence intervals for age differences  
 
            (a) Original data 
 
         (b) Transformed data 
 
 
Figure 4 (a) shows that two of the circles do not overlap. Thus, we may say that we are 
95% confident about the difference between the age groups ≤35 and 36-49 years, while 
we cannot be sure about the difference between ≥50 and the other two age groups. A 
problem with this result may be that the difference between the age groups could be 
driven by the differences between law schools: for example, we have received relatively 
many responses from young German legal scholars and German law schools tend to be 
more “practical”, i.e. this could actually account for the age effect. The same could be 
the case for gender since we received relatively many responses from male German 
scholars, and the two German law schools also tend to be more practical. 
Yet, further analysis does not confirm this suspicion. Checking the precise differ-
ences between the five law schools, there are similar age and gender effects in all but 
one of them (Dublin, where as already stated the response rate is low). Moreover, it is 
possible to conduct a more structured calculation, controlling for differences between 
law schools. For this purpose, we scaled the responses of each respondent according to 
the average of his/her university as compared to the overall average. Then, these trans-
formed data can also be used to produce a ternary plot with centre confidence intervals. 
With respect to age, it can be seen that the Figure 4 (b) looks similar to the original data, 
for example, younger scholars have indeed a tendency to be more practical, and we can 
say with 90% confidence that there is a difference between the ≤35 and 36-49 age 
groups. With respect to the other variables of this section – as well as the two subse-
quent ones – the group differences of the original data also show up if we use the trans-
formed data. Thus, we can assume that differences between the law schools do not drive 
the results of our determinants, and in the following sections we will only report the un-
altered data. 
We did not find that the centre confidence intervals of the other variables, both of 
this section and the two subsequent ones, were significant at the 90% level: for example, 
the gender difference is only significant at the 70% level for the original and at the 65% 
level for the transformed data. This should not be a surprise given that often we only 
have a relatively low number of observations: for example, the age group ≥50 are just 
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22 respondents. It means that the findings of this section need to be interpreted with 
caution. For this reason we also provide frequent references to qualitative information 
(free text comments) in this section.  
 
(ii) Education and training 
 
Figure 5: Research preferences per qualifications 
 
 
In their comments, many of our respondents indicated that training is a key facilitator 
of, and lack of training an important barrier to, methodological evolution.100 In particu-
lar, this is relevant for the social science methods – lest, legal scholars who want to en-
gage in these methods just become “amateur social scientists”.101 The quantitative data 
of Figure 5 confirm this observation for the aggregate level. It can also be checked that 
in all five law schools respondents with a non-law degree are more likely to associate 
with the view of law as a social science. In this respect, it is also notable that 17 of these 
24 respondents have a non-law degree which can be classified as being part of the social 
sciences – mainly, business, sociology or criminology102 – while five have degrees from 
the humanities and two from the natural sciences.  
Scholars who were formerly or continue to be legal practitioners are subject to a 
complex range of influences. While it might be assumed that such a scholar would have 
extensive knowledge of the interpretation methods that practitioners apply, and that 
these competences would have been highlighted and emphasized in their appointment 
by a university, it is not necessarily the case that a scholar of this nature would continue 
to focus on this method. Indeed, Figure 5 does not show that legal scholars who have a 
domestic qualification to practice law are more inclined to practical legal research than 
those who do not have such a qualification. In the free comments, respondents who had 
                                                 
100
 Respondents EDI 39, UEA 2; cf. respondents EDI 15, EDI 21, TCD 9 
101
 Cf. also van Gestel et al., supra note 3, at 14. 
102
 This is line with Mathias Siems, “How close is ‘law’ to other academic disciplines?”, available at 
http://siemslegal.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/how-close-is-law-to-other-academic.html (examining the inter-
disciplinary papers of legal scholars in the U.K.’s Research Assessment Exercise 2008). 
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formerly practiced law also often explained how this change in professional status was 
reflected, over time, in a move towards methods other than practical. For example, three 
comments from English and Scottish legal scholars argued that the need to substantiate 
a practical perspective through theory prompted a gradual move from practical towards 
humanities or pointed to new perspectives gained after leaving practice, although past 
experience of practice also encouraged research that analyzed this sector.103 
A related question is whether a PhD in law makes a difference. In the U.K. context, it 
has recently been suggested that “in the mid-1990s, the rise of the PhD as an entry-level 
qualification changed the nature of some, even very traditional, law schools”.104 Yet, 
Figure 5 does not show such impact on the preferred type of research. Here too, there-
fore, the plausible explanation is that legal scholars who do not have a PhD immerse 
themselves into the academic environment, not least since research of high quality (e.g. 
submitted for the REF)105 helps them in their academic career (in terms of promotion, 
research grants etc). 
 
(iii) Subject matter of research 
 
Figure 6: Research preferences per area of law and jurisdiction 
 
 
It may be expected that there is a relationship between working in a given area of law 
and the use of a method.106 Both our quantitative and qualitative data tend to confirm a 
number of possible differences.107 In our survey, we distinguished between public law 
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 Respondents EDI 2, UEA 11, UEA 13. 
104
 SLSA discussion, 64 Socio-Legal Newsletter 4, 5 (2011) (quoting Sally Wheeler). 
105
 See 3 d (ii), above. 
106
 For instance, Becher, supra note 23, at 133, makes the claim that jurisprudence is “pure” and family 
law is “nothing if not applied”, although this may not reflect the methodological pluralism of present-day 
legal research. 
107
 The following quantitative observations hold for four of the law schools, not Dublin; but note that for 
the latter law school we only have a small number of observations in the three areas-of-law categories (4, 
5, and 4 observations); thus, this non-result for Dublin should not be overinterpreted. 
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(including criminal law), private law and mixtures between public and private law. Fig-
ure 6 shows that, on average, private lawyers are closer to practical legal research than 
public lawyers. This may reflect that the core areas of private law – contract, tort and 
property law – can be studied in a relatively apolitical way (i.e. accepting the common 
(private) law as a fair, efficient system rather than interrogating its underlying political 
basis) and can therefore be subject to a relatively positivist understanding.108 By con-
trast, there is a more “natural” links between research in public law and other disciplines 
(e.g., political science for constitutional law, economics for competition law and sec-
toral regulation). The relatively high social science affiliation of scholars who mix pub-
lic and private law is also plausible since a scholar adopting a social science approach 
may often be interested in the way a particular aim is achieved, be it with tools of public 
or private law, rather than primarily interested in the doctrinal features of, for example, 
contract law. 
Comments provided by our respondents on their areas of interest point to a similar 
direction. For example, one of them mentioned that his research on “property law theo-
ry” is bound to be “very much humanities-like“.109 Another respondent indicated that in 
researching the law of protest, most other research came from non-legal disciplines, 
such as sociology and political science.110 
The second distinction is between domestic law, international law (including com-
parative and European law) and mixtures between them. In the literature, Geoffrey 
Samuel suggests that comparative legal thinking challenges the “authority paradigm”, 
and by doing so turns it into a social science.111 Two comments in our survey also indi-
cate that “comparative law requires an interdisciplinary approach” and that “internation-
al law/EU law [is] considerably determined by political/economic context“.112 Likewise, 
the quantitative data of Figure 6 show that legal scholars who mainly do domestic law 
are more likely to be associated with practical legal research. 
A related question is whether, across law schools and countries, scholars engaged in 
international law (including comparative and European law) may gradually adopt a par-
allel approach to legal research. We therefore also calculated the mean scores per uni-
versity – distinguishing those from pure domestic legal scholars.113 
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 This may be different in areas of private business law (such as company law) where there could be 
closer links to disciplines such as economics and business studies. See also Adler and Simon, supra note 
62, at 180-1 (on approaches to private law by scholars using different methods). 
109
 Respondent UEA 19. 
110
 Respondent UEA 3. 
111
 Geoffrey Samuel, “Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative Law”, 67 Cambridge 
Law Journal 288 (2008). 
112
 Respondent EDI 2. 
113
 Thus, here we combined the numbers for “international” and “mixed domestic / international” since 
“just international” has low n’s for some of the universities (see Table 3, above: only 1 for Düsseldorf and 
only 4 for Bucerius and Dublin). 
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       Table 4: Mean scores for international and “mixed” legal scholars  
         (and how they differ from those of pure domestic legal scholars) 
 
 Humanities Social sciences 
Practical legal 
research 
Bucerius (n: 8) 3.00 (-0.33) 2.38 (+1.04) 4.63 (-0.71) 
Düsseldorf (n: 6) 3.67 (-0.45) 2.17 (+0.34) 4.17 (+0.11) 
Edinburgh (n: 36) 4.64 (-1.53) 3.33 (+0.33) 2.03 (+1.19) 
UEA (n: 13) 3.85 (-0.32) 3.85 (+1.35) 2.31 (-1.03) 
Dublin (n: 7) 5.71 (+1.38) 2.43 (+0.10) 1.86 (-1.48) 
All (n: 70) 4.33 (-0.01) 3.13 (+1.03) 2.54 (-1.02) 
 
It can be seen that in all five law schools international legal scholars are more likely to 
use methods of social sciences.114 In return, they are less likely to associate with practi-
cal legal research. The main exception is Edinburgh, although it needs to be noted that, 
here, few respondents have no interest in international law (or comparative/European 
law) (see Table 3, above) and, on average, the international scholars from Edinburgh are 
still less likely to be associated with practical legal research than those in three of the 
four other law schools. 
In terms of convergence, however, we do not observe a similar method for interna-
tional legal scholars, for example, given the continuing differences in practical legal re-
search between the two German and the three other law schools.115 This may be seen as 
a problem if we think that uniform application of international (and EU) law requires a 
similar approach across countries.116 Yet, some “global” trends may lead to further 
changes, as the following will explain. 
 
b) Dominant and shifting paradigms 
 
In higher education studies it is discussed to what extent an academic discipline needs to 
share a certain level of homogeneity.117 This goes back to Thomas Kuhn  who suggested 
that paradigms characterize “coherent traditions of scientific research”.118 While such 
coherence may indicate some stability, according to Kuhn, there can also be “paradigm 
shifts” challenging current assumptions. Coherent traditions and corresponding shifts in 
legal research may also be identified with our survey approach. Yet, here, we will also 
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 See also Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, “The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholar-
ship”, 106 American Journal of International Law 1  (2012). 
115
 This is also evident if one compares German and English-language textbooks on topics of international 
law, EU law and comparative law; e.g., the former ones tend to put a stronger emphasis on conceptual 
thinking, while the latter ones are more often structured as “cases and materials”. 
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 See van Gestel and Micklitz, supra note 5, at 297. 
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 See, e.g., Paul Trowler, “Depicting and Researching Disciplines: Strong and Moderate Essentialist 
Approaches”, 39 Studies in Higher Education 1720 (2014) (rejecting the view of “essential characteristics 
which are all necessarily present in every instance”). 
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 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 3rd 
ed. 1996). 
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have to consider that law is a diverse field,119 in particular given the differences between 
countries and law schools. 
 
(i) Legal scholars with a clear methodological preference 
 
               Figure 7: Frequency of a dominant paradigm 
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Figure 7 presents the research preferences of those respondents who have assigned a 
score of six or higher (out of ten) to one of the three categories. Thus, these legal schol-
ars seem to have a dominant research paradigm. Figure 7  shows that this is the case for 
around 50 % of the staff of each of the law schools, i.e. there is a roughly equal split be-
tween legal scholars who mix the three methods and those who predominantly use one 
of them. 
In three institutions more than 40% of academics have the same dominant paradigm: 
humanities in Edinburgh and Dublin, and practical legal research at Bucerius. In such 
instances there may be some explicit or implicit pressure to follow this approach. The 
data also show that in the two German law schools practical legal research is the most 
frequent dominant method, whereas it is humanities in the three British and Irish law 
schools. Moreover, as noted previously,120 only the three latter universities have some 
academic staff who consider themselves as “full social scientists”, for example, as they 
work as criminologists within a law school. 
Overall, it can be seen that, at the levels of the law schools, there may be some sup-
port for a “core of legal research”.121 Such a position may extend to lawyers in legal 
practice: Pierre Bourdieu writes about the “social cohesion” of scholars, “designed to 
ensure the durable homogeneity of the habitus”. He then also mentions “law” as a disci-
pline as requiring a high level of cohesion, given that “in the case of the jurists, a body 
                                                 
119
 Cf. Sanne Taekema and Bart van Klink, “Legal Methods under Discussion”, 1 Recht en Methode 1 
(2011) (“In most sciences, generally accepted methods are the core of what constitutes the scientific dis-
cipline in question and what defines its scientific character. This is not the case for the discipline of law”). 
120
 See 3 c, above. See also 2 c, above, on the (possible) non-legal origins of “Law and Society”. 
121
 Cf. Susan Bartie, “The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship”, 30 Legal Studies 345 (2010). 
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of “authorities” cannot present itself in a state of disarray”.122 Yet, this view of legal 
scholarship as supporting the need of legal practice may also have changed in recent 
years. 
 
(ii) Changes of research methods 
 
Figure 8: How did your methods change in the last ten years? 
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The respondents of our survey who were already academics ten years ago were also 
asked to indicate the methods they had used at that time. Figure 8 presents the result of 
these 55 respondents compared to the responses given by the same persons for their re-
search preferences today. It can be seen that practical legal research has become less 
popular, and law as social sciences more popular, with a mixed development as regards 
law as humanities. This empirical finding shows a trend in line with our previous, more 
speculative, research about the developments in the United States, the United States and 
Germany.123 
It is also possible to contextualize this trend within the wider debate about changes in 
legal research. Frequently the question is raised whether Europe should follow U.S. 
trends in legal scholarship and become less focused on doctrinal legal scholarship.124 
Some even suggest that this is already reality. According to Mattias Kumm, there is a  
“salutary effect of American elite law school culture on European scholarship. It has 
encouraged European scholars to overcome the residual habits of a conceptually fo-
cused positivist complacency and more widely reembrace the study of law as a theo-
retically ambitious, internally multidisciplinary exercise”.125 
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 Bourdieu, supra note 10, at 65. 
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 Siems and Mac Síthigh, supra note 2, at 671-4. Similar for the Netherlands (based on an empirical 
study) van Boom and van Gestel, supra note 43. 
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 Cf. van Gestel and Micklitz, supra note 5, at 292. 
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 Mattias Kumm, “On the Past and Future of European Constitutional Scholarship”, 7 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 401 (2009). 
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More cautiously, it may be said that, in Europe, legal scholarship is now a discipline in 
transition.126 Of course, U.S. legal scholarship is also a moving target.127 In addition, the 
decline of doctrinal legal scholarship may not be a matter of course: Rob van Gestel and 
Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz note the possible counter-trend that the complex relationship 
between EU law and the law of the Member States requires “doctrinal scholarship with 
its focus on interpretation and systematisation”.128 
A good illustration of path-dependence and resistance is the discussion about a recent 
report by the German Wissenschaftsrat, a government-funded advisory body.129 In line 
with the German tradition, this report notes the character of law as a “professional dis-
cipline” (Professionsfakultät), seen as a discipline that is “closely linked to both the ac-
ademic system and the respective societal system”. The report also contains a modest 
support for more interdisciplinary legal scholarship at a subordinate level.130 Yet, even 
this modest suggestion is strongly criticized in a comment by a German professor who 
rejects any shift to “law and” research, arguing that this would “threaten what has made 
German legal science strong in the world: the dialogue between academia and judges, in 
particular the embedding of case law within legal doctrine”.131 
It is also clear that the way legal research traditions change is often a complex one.132 
For example, while the individual researcher may follow a certain “herd behavior”,133 
she is also able to find her own position within the academic field134 – or even to shape 
the way paradigms may persist or be subject to change. This leads us to the more gen-
eral questions about the implications of our findings. 
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(own translation). 
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 van Gestel and Micklitz, supra note 5, at 305-7; van Gestel et al, supra note 3, at 4. 
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 Cf. also Cownie, supra note 10, at 104-5 (autonomy as one of the advantages of academic life). 
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5. Implications of empirical findings  
 
It is often said that one cannot infer from “is” to “ought” statements.135 Thus, our empir-
ical study cannot, and did not aim to, establish that one particular method of legal re-
search is “better” than another one.136 Yet, it is possible to draw the following implica-
tions from our empirical findings. 
 
a) Thinking about methods of legal research 
 
The approach, underlying this paper, suggests that one way of understanding methods is 
through surveys of self-identification supplemented by an analysis of the respective in-
stitutions. Thus, in the words of Rob van Gestel and colleagues, this is seen as a way of 
“making the implicit explicit”.137 We would suggest that the good response rate of our 
survey, as well as the observations made in the previous sections, also confirm the fea-
sibility and value of such an approach, particularly when explicit consideration of meth-
ods is often absent from publications. But we also add a note of caution, from our expe-
riences with carrying out the present project, that definitions and terms may not yet have 
a common understanding – and so, speaking the same language in a way that facilitates 
reasoned debate remains to be proven. 
In substance, the fact that, according to our empirical findings, research methods in 
law differ considerably across countries can be considered as a major factor why we 
need to pay more attention to the method of legal research, especially if a more transna-
tional discussion is intended. Given these differences, legal scholars may find that they 
cannot simply take the method, predominant in their jurisdiction, for granted. This is 
most evident for comparative lawyers, as a meaningful comparative study not only re-
quires familiarity with differences in legal rules but also with those in legal style, men-
tality and method. Moreover, as legal systems become more and more interconnected – 
due to international and European law but also soft factors – every legal scholar needs 
to have at least some familiarity with “foreign” understandings about the nature of legal 
scholarship. Awareness of these differences is particularly valuable for emerging schol-
ars or potentially mobile researchers; recall that the mobility of academic researchers is 
a long-standing objective of EU projects and funding streams, as most recently restated 
in the Council Conclusions of 2012 on the European Research Area.138 
Our empirical findings have shown that, in the law schools we studied, social science 
methods have become more and practical methods have become less popular in legal 
research. Growing interdisciplinarity suggests that legal scholars need to pay more ex-
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plicit attention to methodological questions.139 This is also in line with the finding of 
our survey as many of the respondents indicated that training (or lack of training!) is a 
key factor for the use of a particular method, and that understanding the diversity of 
methods facilitates other researchers in contextualizing published work and planning for 
collaborative efforts.140 
Two further findings of this paper are that there is often a split between legal teach-
ing and research, as well as a divergence between the research preferences of more sen-
ior and more junior legal scholars.141 It is suggested that greater awareness for the diver-
sity of methods can reduce this split. In line with the practice in other academic disci-
plines, it would be plausible if legal education were to include more extensive training 
on diverse methodologies. This would then also be an advantage for more junior legal 
scholars as they would find it easier to choose and mix between different methods. 
 
b) Preferences for one or the other research methods 
 
This paper argues that in order to understand different research preferences, the sources 
of influences upon the adoption of methods by an individual scholar, and by groups or 
institutions, must be observed and understood. We point towards possible determinants 
of preferences, and consider (from a range of sources) why these preferences exist. Such 
an understanding of the range of influences is a part of the overall shift towards the 
placing of methodology at the centre of the legal academic discourse. 
For about half of the respondents of our study these diverse sources of influence 
mean that they do not have a dominant method in terms of our three categories, but 
cluster in the “inner triangle” of the ternary plots. More specifically, we found that in 
the two U.K. law schools there is considerable variety in the methods that legal scholars 
use. This may indicate that law is a discipline in transition, possibly because today “we 
need more or other legal methods than in the past”.142 
In particular, it is interesting to observe different preferences in and changes to 
“practical legal research”. According to our data, legal scholars that focus on domestic 
law tend to engage in such research more frequently than comparative and international 
legal scholars. Thus, given the increased interaction between legal systems (as well as 
interactions between economies, cultures, and societies), exclusive use of established, 
domestic legal methods can be seen as a barrier to the full realization of the potential of 
legal scholarship. As the audience for legal scholarship shifts,143 so may methodologies. 
For those interested in promoting humanities and social science approaches, this is also 
an opportunity to highlight the benefits such approaches could bring; training and events 
could be targeted at the “under-represented” group.  
In four of the five law schools of our study academics answered that they use practi-
cal research methods less frequently than ten years ago. This may indicate a desire to 
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shift towards more interdisciplinary approaches in the “globalised world”. However, 
despite this trend, we do not find a convergence in methods for legal scholars who, in 
our survey, indicate that they are engaged with research in international, European 
and/or comparative law. Thus, country differences are still more important for the 
choice of a particular method than the commonality of being an international scholar. 
This may be seen as a problem, for example, since EU law may be understood different-
ly in the United Kingdom, Ireland and in Germany. 
 
c) Resistance and complementarities 
 
Parts of our empirical findings may be interpreted as verifying the existence of a domi-
nant paradigm: at the country level, there are differences in particular between the two 
U.K. and the two German universities. In addition, at the level of individual scholars, 
we found the existence of a dominant model in respect of approximately half of the re-
spondents. Both of these factors may prompt resistance against explicit legal methods 
which fall outside the “preferred” category. This can be seen in particular in the contro-
versies about the use of tools of New Public Management in universities, such as the 
research assessment exercises in the United Kingdom.144 
Criticism of our threefold categorization may also be some evidence of uncertainty in 
law schools on the approach to methods, with a related fear that categorization or identi-
fication is seen as a benchmark or a matter of “right” and “wrong”. For instance, some 
respondents argued that there was no distinction or were not clear on the difference be-
tween practical legal research and law as humanities, while others were content with 
this definition and happy to apportion work between these categories.145 
In substance, a plausible reason for resistance may be that any shift towards one par-
ticular method may weaken the previous one: for example, as research in law becomes 
more closely aligned to (other) social sciences, it may lose its attractiveness to legal 
practice. It was already mentioned that in Germany such a line of criticism has been di-
rected against a recent report by the Wissenschaftsrat.146 In the United States there has 
also been a lively debate about the apparent rise of “impractical legal scholarship”.147 
Moreover, interdisciplinarity may – paradoxically – be criticized as reductionist far as it 
tells legal scholars to apply “ready-made categories and logics of [another] disci-
pline”.148 
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Reflecting on differences between legal research in civil and common law countries, 
it may therefore be tempting to suggest that one should achieve the “best of all worlds” 
and mix the “legal science” approach of the former with the interdisciplinarity of the 
latter countries.149 Possibly, it could then be said that the two U.K. universities in our 
sample (in particular UEA) have already achieved such an equilibrium (including 
through staff turnover), given that all three categories carry some weight.150  
However, it is not a matter of course that a mixed position is always the preferred 
one. The usefulness of such mixing may be limited by the “institutional complementari-
ties”151 of academic structures, such as those we considered in our previous work on this 
topic regarding university governance and external funding of research.152 This is not a 
new line of criticism. At a more philosophical level, Immanuel Kant noted that “every 
science is in itself a system” and that therefore we should not simply treat it as “part of 
another building” but “must work with it architectonically, as a building subsisting for 
itself”.153 Thus, this may speak against any radical paradigm shifts in legal scholarship – 
especially given the existence, in some shape or form, of links between university law 
schools and the regulated legal professions. 
Beyond these general trends, we would suggest that thinking about the direction of 
law as an academic discipline must not lose sight of the freedom of choice of individual 
scholars. For example, as there are more basic and more advanced forms of interdisci-
plinary legal research,154 it should depend on one’s own preferences and skills to what 
extent, say, a mere contextual legal analysis or a full-fledged empirical study is con-
ducted. It is also clear – as it is reflected in some of findings of our survey – that the 
choice of methods is closely related to the subject matter a legal scholar aims to re-
search. Thus, overall, there are good reasons to welcome the growing diversity of mod-
ern forms of legal research. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The “location” of academic disciplines is sometimes contentious: for example, while 
some medical researchers may consider themselves as part of the life sciences, others 
may emphasize the applied and practical nature of medical research.155 Another conten-
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tious divide is between the social sciences and humanities: for example, in the United 
Kingdom, researchers in linguistics and media studies may either apply for funding to 
the research council for arts and humanities or the one for social sciences, depending on 
the specifics of their project.156 
We suggest that legal scholarship is a field that is also torn between these dimensions 
of a practical discipline, the social sciences, and humanities. For the purposes of this 
paper, we conducted an empirical survey of five law schools across Germany, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom. We asked legal scholars to indicate to what extent they use the 
methods of “legal research as part of humanities”, of “legal research as part of social 
sciences”, and/or of “legal research as akin to the analysis of law in legal practice”. 
Subsequently, we presented our results with ternary plots and other tools of classical 
and compositional statistics. Some of the differences in results can be explained by spe-
cific features of the respective law schools. But there is also a clear country effect since 
scholars of the two German law schools have a relatively strong preference for practical 
legal research and scholars of the three U.K. and Irish law schools a relatively strong 
preference for law as humanities, with law as social sciences also being relatively strong 
in the two U.K. law schools. Our analysis suggests that these differences are largely 
driven by institutional differences in higher education. 
In the survey we also collected information about possible determinants of research 
preferences at the individual level. We found that, for instance, international legal 
scholars (including EU and comparative lawyers) tend to be closer to the social sciences 
and that younger scholars and private lawyers tend to be closer to practical legal re-
search. However, even within the group of international legal scholars there are the pro-
found country differences indicated in the previous paragraph. Still, our data show some 
signs of convergence since, across the five law schools, legal scholars told us that they 
tend to use practical legal research methods less often, and social sciences methods 
more often, than ten years ago. In the implications of our empirical findings we elabo-
rated on these and other trends. While our study did not aim to establish that one partic-
ular method of legal research is “better” than another one, we suggest that it shows that 
scholars need to pay attention to different methods, in particular the way these methods 
increasingly mix in order to achieve the “best of all worlds”. 
Future research could include content analysis of sample of papers and detailed in-
terviews. This could enable researchers to identify differences between the (subjective) 
affinities or self-identification of scholars on one hand and the (objective) assessment of 
the use of methods by those same scholars.157 We argue, however, that the views of the 
scholars we surveyed are deserving of consideration even without external review of 
their work as such self-identification may also have an aspirational dimension, thus, in-
dicating possible future developments in legal scholarship. 
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Appendix 1: Email sent to legal scholars 
 
Survey on legal research methods 
 
Dear [Name], 
 
Mathias Siems and I are conducting a new study 
on research methods and it would be great if you 
could help us by responding to a few survey ques-
tions: it should not take more than three to five 
minutes!  
 
We are studying legal research methods across a 
number of jurisdictions. The results will be pre-
sented at a workshop at the EUI in spring 2014 
and subsequently published in a book, Methodol-
ogy in the New Legal World. 
 
Here is a link to the survey: [Link] 
 
This link is uniquely tied to this survey and your 
email address. Please do not forward this mes-
sage. Of course, the data will not be shared with 
anyone else – and in any subsequent publications 
we will only report the aggregate data per law 
school (and anonymise any free text comments).  
 
This project is being carried out in accordance 
with the University of Edinburgh College of Hu-
manities & Social Science Code of Research Eth-
ics. If you wish to withdraw from this project at 
any point after answering the survey, please con-
tact us. 
 
Many thanks! 
 
Daithi and Mathias 
 
Dr Daithi Mac Sithigh  
Lecturer in Digital Media Law 
Edinburgh Law School 
University of Edinburgh 
Old College, South Bridge 
Edinburgh EH8 9YL 
United Kingdom  
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/people/daithimacsithigh  
 
Prof Mathias Siems 
Professor of Commercial Law  
Durham Law School  
Durham University  
Stockton Road  
Durham DH1 3LE  
United Kingdom http://www.dur.ac.uk/mathias.siems/ 
Umfrage zu juristischen Methoden 
 
Sehr geehrter Herr / Sehr geehrte Frau [], 
 
ich hoffe, dass ich Sie um einen kurzen Gefallen bitten 
dürfte. Herr Dr. Mac Sithigh und ich arbeiten an einem 
Projekt zum Einsatz juristischer Methoden und es wäre 
toll, wenn sie uns dabei kurz unterstützen könnten: es 
sollte nicht mehr als drei bis fünf Minuten dauern! 
 
Wir untersuchen, welche Methoden Rechtswissenschaft-
ler in verschiedenen Ländern verwenden. Die Ergebnis-
se werden im nächsten Jahr auf einer Konferenz am Eu-
ropäischen Hochschulinstitut (EUI) vorgestellt und an-
schließend in einem Buch zu „Methodology in the New 
Legal World“ veröffentlicht. 
 
Die Umfrage findet sich auf [] 
 
Dieser Internetlink bezieht sich speziell auf Ihre Email-
Adresse. Bitte leiten Sie ihn deshalb nicht weiter. 
Selbstverständlich werden Ihre Daten strikt vertraulich 
behandelt – und in den nachfolgen Publikationen 
werden wir nur die Aggregatdaten für jede Fakultät 
wiedergeben (und die Kommentare im Freitextfeld 
anonymisieren).  
 
Unser Projekt wird in Übereinstimmung mit dem For-
schungskodex der Universität Edinburgh, UK, durch-
geführt. Es ist Ihnen jederzeit gestattet, Ihre Beteiligung 
zurückzuziehen. 
 
Vielen Dank und beste Grüße, 
 
Mathias Siems und Daithi Mac Sithigh 
 
Prof. Dr. Mathias Siems, LL.M. 
Professor of Commercial Law  
Durham Law School  
Durham University  
Stockton Road  
Durham DH1 3LE  
United Kingdom http://www.dur.ac.uk/mathias.siems/ 
 
Dr. Daithi Mac Sithigh  
Lecturer in Digital Media Law 
Edinburgh Law School 
University of Edinburgh 
Old College, South Bridge 
Edinburgh EH8 9YL 
United Kingdom  
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/people/daithimacsithigh  
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire / survey 
 
Part 1. Which method(s) do you use in your 
research?  
 
Please assume that there are three main 
methods of legal research: 
 
o Legal research as part of humanities, 
i.e. analysis of legal texts (cases, stat-
utes etc) using approaches similar to 
research in humanities (history, phi-
losophy, literature, theology, etc.) 
o Legal research as part of social sci-
ences, i.e. analysis of law in its con-
text, similar to research in social sci-
ences (sociology, economics, psy-
chology etc). 
o Legal research as akin to the analysis 
of law in legal practice, i.e. similar to 
the approaches used by legal practi-
tioners (judges, solicitors etc.) 
 
1) In your current research how frequent-
ly do you use one of these three ap-
proaches?  
 
      Please allocate in total 10 points (e.g., 
something like 5/5/0 or 3/3/4). Note 
that mixtures can be the result of a 
mix of these approaches in individual 
pieces or across various research out-
puts. Please also note that these cate-
gories refer to method not substance. 
 
2) If you were engaged in legal research 
in the course of employment ten years 
ago (i.e. in autumn 2003), how fre-
quently did you use one of these three 
approaches at that time? If you were 
not so engaged, please skip this ques-
tion. 
 
Teil 1: Welche Methoden verwenden Sie in Ihrer 
Forschung? 
 
Bitte nehmen Sie an, dass die juristische For-
schung in die folgenden drei Methoden unter-
gliedert werden kann: 
 
o Juristische Forschung als Teil der 
Geisteswissenschaft, d. h. Forschung, die ju-
ristische Texte (Gesetze, Gerichtsentschei-
dungen etc.) mit Methoden analysiert, die 
denen der Geisteswissenschaften (Geschich-
te, Philosophie, Literatur, Theologie etc.) 
entsprechen. 
o Juristische Forschung als Teil der Sozialwis-
senschaften, d. h. Forschung, die das Recht 
im Kontext mit Methoden untersucht, die 
denen der Sozialwissenschaften (Soziologie, 
Ökonomie, Psychologie etc.) entsprechen. 
o Juristische Forschung als ähnlich der juris-
tischen Vorgehensweise der Rechtspraxis, 
d. h. Forschung, die das Recht mit Methoden 
analysiert, die denen von Rechtspraktikern 
(Richtern, Anwälten etc.) entsprechen. 
 
1) Wie häufig verwenden sie diese Methoden 
in Ihrer gegenwärtigen Forschung? 
 
Bitte verteilen Sie insgesamt 10 Punkte 
(z. B. so etwas wie 5/5/0 oder 3/3/4). Hin-
weis: Mischungen können sich daraus 
ergeben, dass Publikationen verschiede 
Methoden verknüpfen oder dass in 
verschiedenen Publikationen unterschie-
dliche Methoden verwendet werden. Bitte 
beachten sie auch, dass sich die drei Kate-
gorien auf Methoden und nicht den Inhalt 
der Publikationen beziehen. 
 
2) Wenn Sie bereits vor zehn Jahren (also im 
Herbst 2003) beruflich mit juristischer For-
schung beschäftigt waren, wie häufig haben 
sie diese drei Methoden zu dieser Zeit ver-
wendet. Falls dies nicht der Fall war, über-
springen Sie bitte diese Frage. 
 
 39
Part 2. Further questions  
 
1) Gender: (a) male, (b) female  
2) Age: (a) 35 or younger; (b) 36 to 49; 
(c) 50 or older  
3) Current position – please choose one: 
(a) Lecturer; (b) Senior Lecturer, 
Reader, Professor; for Germany: (a) 
Professor (W2, W3 or equivalent); (b) 
any other position 
4) Form of employment – please choose 
one: (a) full-time; (b) part-time (if yes, 
please indicate percentage) 
5) Main area of research – please choose 
one: (a) predominantly public law (in-
cluding criminal law); (b) predomi-
nantly private law; (c) mixed. Note: 
“predominantly” means at least 60% 
(e.g., if you have a 55% / 45% split 
please choose (c)) 
6) Scope of your research – please 
choose one (a) predominantly con-
cerned with UK and/or Scots law; (b) 
predominantly comparative, interna-
tional and/or European; (c) mixed. 
Note: “predominantly” means at least 
60% (e.g., if you have a 55% / 45% 
split please choose (c)) 
7) Training – please choose as many as 
applicable: 
(a) undergraduate law degree or 
equivalent (e.g., State Exam in 
German, JD in the US): (i) domes-
tic (with variation for Scot-
land/UK, (ii) overseas 
(b) masters degree in law (or equiva-
lent): (i) domestic and/or (ii) 
abroad 
(c) doctoral degree in law: (i) domes-
tic and/or (ii) abroad 
(d) eligibility to practice law follow-
ing professional legal qualifica-
tion: (i) domestic and/or (ii) 
abroad 
(e) degree other than law [free text: if 
yes, please specify level – under-
graduate, master or doctorate – 
and discipline] 
 
Teil 2: Weitere Fragen 
 
1) Geschlecht: männlich, weiblich 
2) Alter: 35 oder jünger, 36 bis 49, 50 oder älter 
3) Gegenwärtige Position: Professor (W2, W3 
oder entsprechend), sonstige Position 
4) Art des Anstellungsverhältnisses: Vollzeit, 
Teilzeit (wenn ja, bitte geben Sie die Pro-
zentzahl an) 
5) Hauptforschungsgebiet – bitte wählen Sie 
eines: hauptsächlich Öffentliches Recht 
(inklusive Strafrecht); hauptsächlich 
Privatrecht; gemischt. Hinweis: 
„hauptsächlich“ ist definiert als mindestens 
60% (wenn also z. B. die Aufteilung 55 % / 
45 % ist, wählen Sie bitte (c)). 
6) Umfang Ihrer Forschung – bitte wählen Sie 
eines: hauptsächlich deutsches Recht, 
hauptsächlich vergleichendes, internationales 
und/oder Europäisches Recht; gemischt. 
Hinweis: „hauptsächlich“ ist definiert als 
mindestens 60% (wenn also z. B. die Auftei-
lung 55 % / 45 % ist, wählen Sie bitte (c)).  
7) Ausbildung – bitte wählen so viele wie 
zutreffend: 
(a) Erstes juristischen (Staats-)examen oder 
Äquivalent (z. B. LLB oder JD) in 
Deutschland, im Ausland 
(b) Juristischer Masterabschluss (z. B. 
LL.M.) in Deutschland und/oder im 
Ausland 
(c) Juristische Promotion in Deutschland 
und/oder im Ausland 
(d) Zweites juristisches Staatsexamen oder 
Äquivalent in Deutschland und/oder im 
Ausland 
(e) Abschluss in einer anderen Fachrichtung 
(bitte geben Sie den genauen Abschluss 
– Grad und Disziplin - an) 
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Part 3: Further comments 
 
1) Do you have any further com-
ments about our project? In par-
ticular, we would be interested in 
the reasons why you have adopt-
ed, or not adopted, particular ap-
proaches (e.g., this may refer to 
the topics such as training in par-
ticular methods, collaborations, 
institutional influences) – and as 
far as your methods have changed 
in recent years, the reasons why 
this has been the case. 
2) Are you willing to be contacted 
for a follow-up interview?  
Teil 3: Weitere Kommentare 
 
1) Haben Sie weitere Kommentare haben zu 
unserem Project? Uns würde insbesondere 
interessieren, warum sie bestimmte 
Methoden verwenden – oder nicht ver-
wenden (z. B. könnte dies auf die Ausbild-
ung in bestimmten Methoden, Kollaboration 
oder institutionelle Einflussfaktoren ver-
weisen) – und soweit sich Ihre Methoden 
verändert haben, warum dies der Fall war. 
2) Wären sie bereit, wenn wir Sie gegebenen-
falls zu einem Folgeinterview kontaktieren 
würden? 
 
